Objectives: We determined the available mechanisms to generate income from outpatient parenteral antimicrobial therapy (OPAT) in the UK and calculated the revenue generated from treatment of an episode of cellulitis.
Introduction
Outpatient parenteral antimicrobial therapy (OPAT) is the administration of intravenous antimicrobials to a patient with infection either at home or at an infusion centre, circumventing the need for an overnight stay in hospital, with the aim of shortening or avoiding hospitalization. With careful patient selection and good governance, OPAT is widely recognized to be safe and costeffective. 1 OPAT services have become an established part of healthcare provision worldwide. In the USA, OPAT is a standard treatment modality, benefiting .250 000 patients annually 2 and representing a multi-billion dollar element of healthcare. Specific funding arrangements have matured, ensuring quality is maintained and costs reimbursed. 3 In the UK the development of OPAT has been slower than in the USA, despite recent central emphasis on increasing community-based healthcare. 4 Department of Health documents, such as Start Smart-Then Focus, 5 aiming to improve antimicrobial stewardship, place major emphasis on OPAT, but as yet there is no specific mechanism to fund OPAT in the UK, with current mechanisms acting as a relative barrier to wider development of services.
Current funding arrangements used to support OPAT in the UK will be outlined, using cellulitis as a common worked example to discuss why such arrangements act as a barrier to developing OPAT. Potential solutions are also proposed.
Methods
Revenue generated using English National Health Service (NHS) Payment-by-Results (PbR) tariffs was calculated for a patient receiving treatment for cellulitis using different pathways and funding streams, for both an inpatient stay and for OPAT treatment. A glossary of the NHS terminology used is provided in Table 1 . There is no prescribed OPAT coding strategy within PbR. An episode of uncomplicated cellulitis with admission on day 1 and treatment finished on day 7 was used to calculate a range of possible payments using 2014 -15 PbR tariffs. Calculations were based on: (i) a 7 day inpatient stay; (ii) a 2 day inpatient stay plus 5 days of OPAT using early discharge, with transfer to a virtual ward or day-attender service model; and (iii) 7 days of OPAT with no inpatient stay using an ambulatory care and day-attender tariff or admission to a virtual ward. An infectious disease outpatient appointment was also costed (iv). Financial information regarding payments was taken from the National Tariff Payment System. 6 Selected established OPAT services in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (with no PbR mechanism) were contacted to determine individual national funding arrangements.
Results

England
For an episode of uncomplicated cellulitis requiring 7 days of treatment, a traditional inpatient episode generated £1361 of revenue, while OPAT generated revenue ranging from £773 to £2084 (Table 2 ). Thus, provision of an OPAT service, depending on the model adopted, results in income generation for the acute trust between minus £588 and plus £723 relative to a traditional inpatient stay (57%-153%), with reciprocal cost implications for Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Revenue calculations relate to an individual patient episode and take no account of additional income generated by admitting additional patients to the same bed released by OPAT.
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales
There is no specific funding or national policy for OPAT in these countries. Furthermore, the English PbR system and ambulatory care same-day discharge payments do not exist to support OPAT service funding directly. Instead, national health boards issue central funding to individual hospitals to meet all healthcare needs for their catchment population with block contracts.
Individual countries may additionally provide financial incentives to develop OPAT services. In Northern Ireland there is limited funding for clinical in-reach nurses/district nurses to deliver intravenous antibiotics, but patients, when they are outside hospital, are regarded as the responsibility of primary care and consequently there is little concept of OPAT. In Scotland, local OPAT champions have negotiated directly with local health boards to secure funding via individual business cases and targeted winter bed-pressure money to pump-prime OPAT services. Such regional activity has prompted debate in the Scottish Parliament about inequity across the regions. A similar system exists in Wales; healthcare is centrally funded to health boards for local hospitals, with certain regional services funded through the Welsh Health Specialised Services Committee. OPAT services are therefore developed locally or not at all. 
HRG
Hospital admission data are recorded using diagnostic and procedure codes. Patient episodes that are of a similar nature and complexity are grouped using standard software into HRGs. An HRG comprises five characters, each one adding depth of meaning to the individual patient episode.
Trim point A statistically derived length of stay that denotes the upper limit of expected length of stays for an admission with a given HRG.
Excess bed days
The number of additional inpatient days over the trim point for a given HRG. Excess bed days only operate when the inpatient episode exceeds the trim point.
Tariff
Each HRG has an associated national tariff that is calculated annually to reflect national average prices for costs incurred in providing the care necessary for the condition specified in the HRG. The HRG is paid by the appropriate commissioner. Local tariffs can be agreed between local commissioners and providers for specific activities.
PbR English healthcare providers negotiate contracts with separate commissioners, which convert the volume, range and complexity of the healthcare provided into a monetary value using a system known as PbR. The value of the contract is determined by calculating the HRG tariff plus excess bed-day cost for each patient episode. Accurate coding of patient episodes is essential.
Virtual ward A group of patients under the care of an acute provider who are not physically situated in beds within the hospital. Patients on a virtual ward continue to have the same status as inpatients physically present in the hospital for governance purposes and a named consultant remains accountable for their care until discharged from the virtual ward.
Day attender A patient who receives a planned sequence of specific treatments under the immediate direction of an acute provider and who returns home for the remainder of the 24 h period. The patient may attend the provider for treatment or hospital staff may attend the patient in their own home. Tariffs are often negotiated locally between provider and commissioner; e.g. £196 in the Isle of Wight (2013-14).
The enigma of the OPAT code 1237 JAC This table shows a range of potential options under English PbR tariffs to fund treatment of a patient with cellulitis for 7 days and income generated by acute provider of service. See Table 1 for glossary of definitions. a Provision of OPAT may be subcontracted to a home healthcare company or other provider based on local negotiation of a daily tariff benchmarked by the infectious disease treatment function 350 tariff. Any gap between PbR income and negotiated tariff may support core specialist functions retained by the original acute provider, including specialist OPAT core team, and will reflect accountability for continued care whilst on OPAT service. b The assessment centre may be operated by any commissioned OPAT provider.
Discussion
This paper highlights the absence of specific funding mechanisms to support OPAT services across the UK. In Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales there is fixed-price contracting between commissioners and providers with no activity-based component to the contract. The only direct mechanism for providers to realize the cost savings achieved using OPAT is to reduce the number of inpatient beds, realizing associated cost savings. Commissioners benefit because of lower overall costs. Those providers that have successfully established OPAT services have done so in recognition of the improved patient experience and the reduction in pressure on bed occupancy that accompanies reduced length of stay.
In England PbR funding creates incentive for acute trusts (i.e. NHS trusts that provide secondary health services within the English NHS) to increase patient flow, if high-quality coding of patient episodes is undertaken using Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) tariffs (Table 1 ). The system rewards providers for 'working harder' and treating more patients. English providers that establish OPAT services can 'work smarter' within the PbR system because OPAT facilitates early discharge/avoidance of admission, enabling providers to deliver additional episodes of care for each inpatient bed.
The PbR system is complex and income can be manipulated by the methodology used to code. This study demonstrates that the income for a single 7 day episode of intravenous antibiotic treatment for cellulitis can vary nearly 3-fold from £773 to £2084. Other infections suitable for OPAT will have different HRG tariffs, trim points and excess bed-day costs, generating different incomes.
However, the reduced length of stay derived from using OPAT also creates additional capacity to treat more patients. So, using the illustrated 7 day cellulitis episode, treating two patients as inpatients each for 2 days plus a further 5 days using OPAT creates the capacity to treat a further five cellulitis patients in a similar manner compared with treating only two patients entirely as inpatients for 7 days each. This increases potential income to the English acute provider from £2722 for two 7 day traditional inpatient episodes to £9527 for seven episodes using the same two inpatient beds (together comprising two inpatient days with transfer to a virtual ward for the duration of OPAT; this represents efficient use of expensive acute provider facilities. With current funding arrangements, cost savings generated are retained entirely by the acute provider. Ambulatory care tariffs are much more limited in scope, but include a cellulitis tariff that can be used for OPAT, with even greater incentive to treat cellulitis using this model. Moreover, OPAT can deliver care of equally high standard for as little as 60% of the cost of comparable inpatient care, 7 generating considerable cost savings. Specific local contracting agreements, such as excess bed-day caps or agreement between CCGs and acute providers not to adhere to PbR contracting tariffs, may affect the ability of acute trusts to generate income from OPAT. Furthermore, PbR stipulates that the additional value of all emergency care provided above a baseline value calculated from activity performed in 2008 -09 is paid at a marginal rate, limiting additional income generation. However, within the existing PbR tariff system there appear to be compelling financial reasons for English providers with sufficient infection resource and sophisticated coding ability to provide an OPAT service.
English commissioners have been critical of both PbR and the use of HRG tariff coding to gain income. 8 The permitted variation in charges that can be levied for a cellulitis episode, depending on the coding methodology, supports this concern. Until this is resolved and a proportion of the cost saving generated by OPAT is passed on to CCGs, there appears little financial incentive for commissioners to invest in OPAT, despite the demonstrated benefits and the drive for OPAT to be one of the Start Smart-Then Focus options.
One solution would be to introduce a standard OPAT tariff to replace the variety of methodologies currently permitted, set at a rate to ensure that CCGs and OPAT providers share average cost savings derived from OPAT. Such a tariff would unbundle OPAT income from the income generated by the specialty providing care for the inpatient episode and facilitate provision of ongoing OPAT care by a range of providers, including the original acute provider, community-based services and home healthcare companies. A similar system is used to reimburse costs of OPAT in the USA. 3 The infectious disease treatment function (outpatient appointment) 350 tariff already exists within PbR and is a suitable benchmark OPAT tariff for local negotiation, reducing costs to commissioners while still incentivizing admission avoidance strategies for acute providers. Furthermore, this tariff generates income proportional to the OPAT activity delivered and will encourage the commissioning of efficient services.
Savings and additional income derived from early discharge of OPAT patients prior to the trim point would fund the specialist core OPAT team within the acute provider necessary to design and initiate an appropriate plan. All OPAT providers must demonstrate that they have sufficient specialist resource to ensure the proper governance and safety of the OPAT service provided.
